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**Comments on Proposed Amendments To
N.J.A.C. 13:21-1.3, 8.1, and 8.2 And
Proposed New Rule at N.J.A.C. 13:21-
8.2A**

June 3, 2016.

Raymond P. Martinez, Chairman and Chief Administrator
c/o Kate Tasch, Administrative Practice Office
Regulatory and Legislative Affairs
Motor Vehicle Commission
225 East State Street, PO Box 162
Trenton, NJ 08666-0162

Dear Chairman Martinez:

1. The American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey and the Rutgers Constitutional Rights Clinic (the “Commenters”) respectfully submits these comments regarding the proposed amendments to N.J.A.C. 13:21-1.3, 8.1, and 8.2 as well as the proposed new rule at N.J.A.C. 13:21-8.2A which were published April 4, 2016 (48 N.J. Reg. 569(a)).
2. The ACLU of New Jersey, the state affiliate of the national American Civil Liberties Union, is an organization with tens of thousands of members and supporters statewide, dedicated to advancing the values enshrined in the Bill of Rights, as well as those protected in the New Jersey Constitution, including the right to privacy. The Rutgers Constitutional Rights Clinic, first established in 1970 as the Constitutional Litigation Clinic, engages in “impact” litigation and advocacy in the area of individual civil liberties and civil rights, including the right to privacy, as protected in the constitutions of the United States and the State of New Jersey.
3. The proposed regulations provide for New Jersey to become compliant with federal requirements for the REAL ID Act, Pub. L. 109–13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005),¹ a national ID card initiative. As part of that compliance the MVC will be scanning and retaining the documents of all of those who obtain a REAL ID complaint driver’s license. The effect of the proposed regulations would be to allow New Jersey to implement a key requirement of the REAL ID Act, which requires that the State retain copies of the “application, declaration and source documents” presented to obtain a REAL ID compliant identification. 6 C.F.R. § 37.31.

I. General Concerns About a General National ID System.

4. Although not the primary purpose of these comments, Commenters make general note of their concern about the establishment of a *de facto* national ID system and accompanying database. While the REAL ID Act was ostensibly adopted to improve security, it increases the risk of identity theft and government abuse without an increase in overall safety.²

¹ Codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30301; 6 C.F.R. § 37.31.

² See, e.g. Jim Harper, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee, in Testimony before New Hampshire State Senate Committee on Public and Municipal Affairs: <http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-jh041106.html>, Apr. 10, 2006 (“I have studied identification and identity cards carefully, and I want you to know that a national ID is neither a protection from terrorism nor a response to the

5. Commenters note that the creation and implementation of what is effectively a national ID system would cost American taxpayers at a minimum \$4 billion. The system also brings our nation further down the road of intrusive surveillance and monitoring of citizens. The *de facto* national government database that would be created would contain millions of Americans' private information. Access to this information will be eagerly sought by third-parties such as employers, credit agencies, landlords, private investigators, and countless others, further eroding the fundamental right to privacy that Americans have always cherished. And each state database will create a treasure trove for hackers and identity thieves.
6. A national ID card system would not protect us from terrorism, but it would create a system of internal passports that would significantly diminish the freedom and privacy of law-abiding citizens. Once put in place, it is exceedingly unlikely that such a system would be restricted to its original purpose. Social Security numbers, for example, were originally intended to be used only to administer the retirement program. But that limit has been routinely ignored and steadily abandoned over the past 50 years. A national ID system would threaten the privacy that Americans have always enjoyed and gradually increase the control that government and business wields over everyday citizens.
7. Regrettably, the proposed amendments and accompanying commentary do not take into account the weighty privacy concerns implicated by their provisions, even under the required "Social Impact Statement." Commenters urge the Commission to consider the impact on the privacy interests on the public that will be affected by this regulation.

II. The Commission Has Not Demonstrated That the Non-Real ID Compliant Option Would Allow for The License To Serve Its Primary Purpose Of Allowing Drivers To Drive In New Jersey and at the Same Time Preserve Privacy Interests.

8. The apparent solution offered by the Commission to the widespread concerns raised by those who oppose a national ID card system and database is to offer an applicant the choice of either seeking a Real ID compliant driver's license or identification card, or alternatively choosing the non-Real ID compliant option and accepting the resulting limitations on use of that non-Real ID compliant card for establishing identity for federal purposes. In reality, however, the non-Real ID compliant option does not provide the applicant with a meaningful choice in protecting the applicant's privacy interests.
9. Commenters note that there are differences in the types of documents that are acceptable to obtain a REAL ID compliant license or identification card, as compared to the non-
2. _____

attacks of September 11, 2001. A national ID would satisfy the federal government's demand for control — not Americans' genuine need for security and law enforcement"); see also Senator Lorraine Inouye (D - HI), ("The [Real ID] act will decrease, not increase, our national security...Real IDs will create a false sense of security in the people to whom the IDs are presented...Identification, false or otherwise, was not a big part of the planning or execution of the 9/11 attacks. The hijackers did little to hide their true identities. They entered the country on tourist visas, using valid passports. They used their own names with banks and did not use false Social Security numbers. Most terrorists rely on surprise and indifference to consequences, not anonymity. Magnetometers, X - ray machines and sensors work better than drivers' licenses in stopping terrorists.").

REAL ID compliant option. From the perspective of an applicant choosing between the two options with the goal of enhancing personal privacy interests, however, there is very little practical difference. The documents are still drawn from a broad array of private human activity, and their retention after inspection by an MVC representative represents a significant infringement of privacy regardless.

10. As noted in Section III below, as a matter of New Jersey administrative law and procedure, the Commission does not yet have the authority to digitize and retain copies of documents presented at an MVC agency to establish identity under the six point system. Even assuming that the Commission had such regulatory authority, however, it should only apply to those who choose the REAL ID compliant option. Yet the current proposed amendments do not provide, for those who choose the non-REAL ID compliant option, to avoid having their documents scanned and retained (and potentially available for inspection by a variety of authorities indefinitely). There is little point, from a privacy perspective, to offer the non-REAL ID option if it provides no meaningful distinctions compared to the REAL ID option.
11. Since the non-REAL ID compliant option need not comply with federal requirements, the MVC need not – and should not - retain scanned copies of source documents for non-Real ID applicants. This would ensure that individuals who choose non-Real ID are given a viable alternative, which protects their privacy concerns by not retaining and scanning the documents necessary under the six-point system to obtain a non-REAL ID document. **The proposed amendments should therefore be changed to reflect that source documents shall not be scanned and retained if the applicant chooses the non-REAL ID compliant option.**

III. While the Commission Alleges That They Have the Authority to Scan Documents, Commenters Note That the Proposed Rules Providing the Commission with Such Authority Have Not Been Finalized.


12. The current proposed amendments assert that “The Commission will already be retaining copies of the documents that are submitted with the application.” 48 N.J.R. 569(a), Type at 13-14. This assertion is at best premature, and misstates the Commission’s lawful authority.
13. The Commission published proposed amendments to N.J.A.C. 13:21-8.2 and N.J.A.C. 13:82-8.20,1 on October 5, 2015 (47 N.J. Reg. 2428), that would, if adopted, have authorized the Commission to digitally scan and retain copies of all documents submitted in connection with a driver’s license application or renewal.
14. The current Commenters submitted extensive comments to the October 5, 2015, proposed amendments on November 30, 2015, which described the grave privacy concerns that are triggered by such wholesale retention of personally sensitive documents and data. A copy of those comments are attached to these comments.
15. To date, the Commission has not responded to comments as required under the Administrative Procedure Act, nor has it promulgated the proposed regulations. It would therefore not only premature, but structurally invalid as a matter of administrative

process, to proceed with the current proposed amendments and new rule promulgation until the prior rulemaking process is concluded.

Respectfully submitted,



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American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey



Ronald K. Chen
Rutgers Constitutional Rights Clinic

APPENDIX A

**Comments Previously Submitted to the Proposed Amendments to N.J.A.C. 13:21-8.2 and
N.J.A.C. 13:82-8.20**



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**Comments to the Proposed Amendments to
N.J.A.C. 13:21-8.2 and N.J.A.C. 13:82-8.20**

November 30, 2015

Raymond P. Martinez, Chairman and Chief Administrator
c/o Kate Tasch, Administrative Practice Officer
Regulatory and Legislative Affairs
Motor Vehicle Commission
225 East State Street, PO Box 162
Trenton, NJ 08666-0162

Dear Chairman Martinez:

1. The American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey and the Rutgers Constitutional Rights Clinic (the “Commenters”) respectfully submits these comments regarding the proposed amendments to *N.J.A.C. 13:21-8.2* and *N.J.A.C. 13:82-8.20*,³ which were published October 5, 2015 (47 N.J. Reg. 2428).

2. The ACLU of New Jersey, the state affiliate of the national American Civil Liberties Union, is an organization with approximately tens of thousands of members and supporters statewide, dedicated to advancing the values enshrined in the Bill of Rights, as well as those protected in the New Jersey Constitution, including the right to privacy. The Rutgers Constitutional Rights Clinic, first established in 1970 as the Constitutional Litigation Clinic, engages in “impact” litigation and advocacy in the area of individual civil liberties and civil rights, including the right to privacy, as protected in the constitutions of the United States and the State of New Jersey.

3. In 2012, the ACLU-NJ initiated a lawsuit in the Superior Court of New Jersey, *ACLU-NJ v. Martinez*, in which it challenged implementation by the Commission of the “TRU ID” system as not consistent with the Administrative Procedures Act. After the court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting implementation of TRU ID, the Commission and the ACLU-NJ reached a settlement agreement whereby the Commission agreed to retain the existing 6-point identification system without change, absent promulgation of proper regulations, written notice of which would be given to the ACLU-NJ. Commenter ACLU-NJ received written notice of these proposed regulations on October 8, 2015.

4. The proposed regulations would authorize the Commission to “to scan applications, declarations, and documents that are presented by the Commission's customers to satisfy the six-point identification system requirements when obtaining permits, licenses, and non-driver identification cards.” The proposed amendments also indicate that the scanned applications, declarations, and documents will be retained electronically in accordance with Division of Revenue and Enterprise Services (DORES) statutes and retention schedules.

5. The notice states generally that the purpose of the proposed amendments “is to ensure the integrity of the Commission's six-point identification verification system by enabling the Commission to conveniently access and verify the application and documents that were submitted by the customer in order to obtain the Motor Vehicle Commission document.” Neither the notice nor proposed regulations state explicitly that they are proposed in order to implement the proposed “TRU ID” system, or to bring New Jersey into compliance with the

³ For ease of reference, each paragraph in these comments is numbered sequentially.

federal REAL ID Act, Pub. L. 109–13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005). Nevertheless, the effect of the proposed amendments would be to allow New Jersey to implement a key requirement of the REAL ID Act, which requires that the State retain copies of the “application, declaration and source documents” presented to obtain a REAL ID compliant identification. 6 C.F.R. § 37.31.

6. Enactment of these proposed amendments would effect a dramatic change in both the quality and quantity of private individual information that the Commission retains in a new digital data warehouse. As further explained below, Commenters believe that the proposed regulations do not adequately take into account the privacy interests of the people of New Jersey in at least two respects:

a. The Commission has not identified any substantial and legitimate need to *retain* copies of personal documents—which can contain extremely sensitive individual information—once the originals of those documents have already been inspected, and the identity of the applicant established, by an authorized MVC official.

b. Even if there were a legitimate need to retain copies of individual source documents, the proposed regulations (despite the cross-reference to the DORES statutes and retention schedules) do not provide for adequate safeguards to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of the personally identifiable information collected, stored, and maintained by MVC and that would guard against unauthorized disclosure. Nor does the reference to DORES retention schedules give adequate guidance on how long the documents will be retained.

IV. The Commission Has Not Demonstrated that It Has any Need to Retain Individual Personal Documents that Would Outweigh the Intrusion into Privacy Interests.

7. The proposed scanning and retention of the millions of personal source documents presented each year to MVC by New Jersey residents vividly illustrates the now well-documented challenges to personal privacy brought about by “big data,” i.e. advances in technology that allow both the storage and analysis of information—both digital and analog—on a scale previously impossible. As noted by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (“PCAST”) in transmitting the *Report to the President, Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective* (available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_and_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf):

Big data drives big benefits, from innovative businesses to new ways to treat diseases. The challenges to privacy arise because technologies collect so much data (e.g., from sensors in everything from phones to parking lots) and analyze them so efficiently (e.g., through data mining and other kinds of analytics) that it is possible to learn far more than most people had anticipated or can anticipate given continuing progress. These challenges are compounded by limitations on traditional technologies used to protect privacy (such as de-identification). PCAST concludes that technology alone cannot protect privacy, and policy intended to protect privacy needs to reflect what is (and is not) technologically feasible.

Transmittal Letter to President Obama from John Holdren and Eric Lander, May 2014.

8. Commenters agree with the President’s Council and others who have noted that any undertaking to collect and retain personal information on the scale proposed by the

Commission brings with it a concomitant obligation to adopt policy appropriately crafted to balance the State's need to collect and retain this information against unwarranted intrusions on personal privacy. Absent such an affirmative articulation of the *need* for such data retention, as well as a policy designed to prevent against unauthorized use and disclosure of such information, Commenters believe that the proposed regulations would be a per se arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the Commission's rule-making authority.

9. Courts have also recognized a constitutional dimension to the intrusion on privacy caused by governmental collection and retention of personal information. "The factors which should be considered in deciding whether an intrusion into an individual's privacy is justified are the type of record requested, the information it does or might contain, the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated, the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, *the degree of need for access*, and whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward access." *United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.*, 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added); *see also, C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.*, 430 F.3d 159, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2005).

10. The current list of source documents that might be potentially scanned and stored under the proposed amendments is exhaustive, and touches upon virtually all aspects of a private resident's life: health records, financial and asset records, educational records, familial status records, immigration records, tax records, and more. That list includes:

birth certificate	US military discharge papers	waiver certificate for the written portion of the driver's test
US passport	FAA pilot license	Veterans Affairs universal access photo ID card
Current NJ digital driver license, boat license or non-driver ID card	Current/expired less than one year non-digital NJ PHOTO driver license	Utility or credit card bill issued in the past 90 days
Valid active duty US military photo ID card	Current photo driver license from any other U.S. state, the District of Columbia or the U.S. Territories of American Samoa and Guam, Puerto Rico or the U.S. Virgin Islands	Checking or savings account statement from a bank or credit union, issued in the past 60 days
US adoption papers	Social Security card	High school or college report card or transcript containing address, issued within the past two years
Certificate of naturalization	Bank statement or record	Original lease or rental agreement showing name as the lessee or renter
Certificate of citizenship	ATM card with preprinted name and applicant's signature.	Property tax bill, statement or receipt from the past year
Civil marriage, domestic partnership or civil union	Current health insurance card, prescription card OR Employee ID card with printed pay stub	Any letter or correspondence (including tax bills) received from the IRS or state tax office in the last year
Order or decree of divorce, dissolution or termination	State professional license	First-class mail received from any federal, state or local government agency in the past six months
Court order for a legal name change, signed by a judge or court clerk	NJ public assistance card with photo (also known as a NJ Social Services ID card)	Foreign passport with INS or USCIS verification and valid record of arrival/departure (Form I-94)
Current US military dependent card	High school diploma, GED or college diploma	Foreign passport with INS or USCIS verification and valid Form I-551
US military photo retiree card	Property tax statement, bill or receipt issued by a New Jersey municipality	
Valid NJ firearm purchaser card	For NJ high school students: a	
US school photo ID card with transcript or school records		
US college photo ID card with transcript		
Valid federal, state or local government employee driver license		
Valid federal, state or local government employee photo ID card		

stamp	"Parolee," "Asylee" or "Notice of Action" (Form I-797 approved petition) by INS or USCIS	I-766).
Current alien registration card (new Form I-551) with expiration date and verification from INS or USCIS	Valid I-94 with attached photo stamped "Processed for I-551..." by INS or USCIS	Current alien registration card (old Form I-551) without expiration date and with INS or USCIS verification
Refugee travel document (Form I-571)	Current photo employment authorization card (Form I-688B or	Photo temporary resident card (Form I-688)
US re-entry permit (Form I-327)		
Valid I-94 stamped "Refugee,"		

11. Commenters acknowledge that the Commission has a legitimate interest in determining the correct identity and place of residence of any person seeking a New Jersey motor vehicle license or non-driver ID card. That interest has been quite satisfactorily addressed for many years through the current six point identification system, in which personal source documents are produced for *inspection* by a trained and authorized MVC official at the time of license issuance or renewal. The proposed amendments, however, trigger a requirement that the Commission demonstrate the need to *retain* scanned copies of those source documents in a new MVC data warehouse. The proposed amendments do not articulate, much less justify, the need to retain copies of the document, as distinct from the need to inspect them.

12. The notice states that the need for scanning and retention of source documents is “to ensure the integrity of the Commission's six point identification verification system by enabling the Commission to conveniently access and verify the application and documents that were submitted by the customer in order to obtain the Motor Vehicle Commission document.” The notice in particular refers to the legislative findings contained in N.J.S.A. 39:2A-2, in which the Legislature noted that “Criminals have used counterfeit passports, Social Security cards, county identification cards, pay stubs and W-2 forms to obtain fraudulent driver's licenses and identification cards in furtherance of identity-theft schemes.” N.J.S.A. 39:2A-2(i). The Legislature also cited the report of the Fix DMV Commission,⁴ issued thirteen years ago in November 2002, to support the contention that “The DMV's failed security systems are contributing to a growing national problem of identity theft.” The fraud referenced in the Fix DMV report was fraud perpetuated by former *DMV employees* in 2002.

13. Of course, the current six point identification system, cited nationally as a “best practice,”⁵ was the major response to the problems identified by the Legislature in 2002, and by the Fix DMV Commission. The proposed amendments do not articulate in any detailed fashion how long term retention of source documents will significantly improve the Commission’s ability to detect fraudulent activity *by the MVC customer*, as opposed to fraudulent activity by MVC employees. It is completely unclear why such future potential misconduct by MVC employees requires retention of mass quantities of personal information regarding MVC customers.

⁴ <http://www.state.nj.us/mvc/pdf/About/finalreport.pdf>.

⁵ New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission, *4 Years of Progress, March 30, 2007 Service Assessment*, p.4, available at <http://www.state.nj.us/mvc/pdf/About/March302007.pdf>

14. If the Commission identified the proposed practice that would require regular reference to the source documents, then it might be possible to balance the need for such use against the intrusion into privacy. But absent such a systemic plan to discover customer fraud by reference to the retained source documents, retention of private records under a “just in case” rationale is the type of overreaching that, while made logistically possible by the advances in “big data,” does not provide sufficient justification for widespread retention of private information without a particularized *use* of such information being identified.

V. The Commission’s Failure to Provide for Safeguards Against Unauthorized Disclosure Renders Retention of Private Source Documents Unreasonable and Unlawful.

15. In addition to failing to articulate the need for retention of private source documents after having been inspected by the Commission, the proposed regulations fail to adequately describe the safeguards that it will implement to prevent this vast warehouse of private and identifiable information from unauthorized disclosure. Such safeguards are essential to protecting the individual’s constitutional, statutory and common law privacy interests. *See Westinghouse*, 638 F.2d at 578; *compare Whalen v. Roe*, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (allowing collection of personal health information where statute imposed safeguards against unauthorized disclosure).

16. The proposed amendments make a sweeping incorporation by reference to “Division of Revenue and Enterprise Services (DORES) statutes and retention schedules.” Inspection of the DORES statutes and retention schedules, however, reveal *no* procedures, practices of safeguards by which unauthorized disclosure would be prevented. And if the Commission is concerned about recent instances of misconduct by its own employees (see ¶12 above), then it must also take into account the recent instances in which MVC employees have been charged with selling confidential information.⁶ The DORES statutes and retention schedules fails to define any standards that will sufficiently secure the sensitive information which is being retained by the DMV, or that will limit the government employees that have access to it.

17. Indeed, the proposed amendments do not even comply with federal requirements under the REAL ID Act. 6 C.F.R. § 37.31 requires that “States shall take measures to protect any personally identifiable information collected pursuant to the REAL ID Act as described in their security plan under § 37.41(b)(2).” 6 C.F.R. § 37.41(b)(2) in turn requires a state to adopt a security plan that contains, in part:

Reasonable administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of the personally identifiable information collected, stored, and maintained in DMV records and information systems for purposes of complying with the REAL ID Act. These safeguards must include procedures to prevent unauthorized access, use, or dissemination of applicant

⁶ *See* “Two Motor Vehicle Commission workers charged in identity theft,” http://www.nj.com/mercer/index.ssf/2011/11/two_motor_vehicle_commission_w.html.

information and *images of source documents retained pursuant to the Act and standards and procedures for document retention and destruction.*

(emphasis added).

18. The proposed amendments do not refer to any “administrative, technical, and physical safeguards” that prevent unauthorized access. The DORES statutes and retention schedules merely provide schedules for retention of classes of documents, not measures that protect against unauthorized access or disclosure. Moreover, the DORES retention schedules for state agencies currently do not even provide a destruction date for source documents retained by MVE (http://www.nj.gov/treasury/revenue/rms/pdf/G100000_007.pdf).⁷ Nor do the proposed regulations comply with the particular privacy requirement of the REAL ID Act that, “Upon request by an applicant, a [State](#) shall record and retain the applicant's name, date of birth, certificate numbers, date filed, and issuing *agency in lieu of an image or copy of the applicant's birth certificate*, where such procedures are required by State law.” 6 C.F.R. § 37.31(c) (emphasis added).

19. Indeed, the compilation of this vast amount of sensitive personal information will create a treasure trove for identification thieves, whether they are hackers or government employees. The database thereby seemingly creates more, rather than less, risk of fraud (especially where fraud by customers – as opposed to employees – has not been shown to be a significant issue absent the proposed retention of records).

20. Absent any adoption (through the appropriate rule-making process) of administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of the source documents retained by the Commission, adoption of these proposed amendments are an inherently unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of the Commission’s rule-making authority.

VI. Conclusion

21. The proposed amendments to *N.J.A.C. 13:21-8.2* and *N.J.A.C. 13:82-8.20* constitute a sea change in the amount of private information, and the nature of that information, that MVC will now retain concerning the motoring public in a data warehouse of unprecedented scope and size. Without further articulation of the *need* to retain such information, and a description of the security plan to guard against unauthorized disclosure, Commenters urge the Commission not to enact these amendments in their current form.

Respectfully submitted,



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⁷ The REAL ID Act requires that such records be retained for 10 years. 6 C.F.R. § 37.31(a)(3).